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POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST IN CONTRACT ACTIONS
AGAINST THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS:
WAVE GOOD-BYE TO THE COMMON LAW WAIVER OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is not liable for postjudgment interest in contract actions.' The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts resolved this previously unsettled issue in Chapman v.
University of MassachusettsMedical Center2 The court declared "a
claim for postjudgment interest is noncontractual and must be
authorized statutorily.",3 The court explained the Commonwealth is
See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 586, 670
N.E. 166, 168 (1996) (holding the Commonwealth not liable for postjudgment
interest). Postjudgment interest is the interest that accrues on a judgment for the
time period between final judgment and payment. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
235, § 8 (1986) (authorizing interest on a judgment). Chapter 235, section 8
states in part, that "the warrant or execution issued on a judgment... shall require
the collection or satisfaction thereof with interest from the day of its entry." Id.
2 See Chapman, 423 Mass. at 586, 670 N.E.2d at 168 (recognizing no
decision or statute directly authorizes Chapman's recovery for postjudgment
interest).
' Id. at 588, 670 N.E.2d at 169. A common law waiver of sovereign
immunity exists when the Commonwealth contracts with a private party. See
Monadnock Display Fireworks, Inc. v. Andover, 388 Mass. 153, 156-57, 445
N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1983) (finding the municipality owed a duty to the plaintiff
upon entering into a contract).
The Commonwealth submits itself to the courts and the laws as if it were a
private citizen at the time it enters into a contract. See Nash v. Commonwealth,
174 Mass. 335, 339, 54 N.E. 865, 867 (1899) (recognizing the Commonwealth's
accountability in its own courts if the claim against it is just). The court in Nash
analyzed the affect of the statute that gave the superior court "jurisdiction of all
claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in equity." Id. at 338, 54
N.E. at 865; 1887 Mass. Acts ch. 246. The court held the statute did not create a
new obligation upon the Commonwealth or give rise to a new claim, but rather
gave Nash a forum to bring an already recognizable claim. See id. at 338, 54
N.E. at 865 (discussing Nash's erroneous interpretation of the statute).
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not required to pay postjudgment interest, absent a contractual provision or a statute, because the government enjoys the protections of
sovereign immunity.4 The court found no common law waiver or express statutory waiver existed that permitted Chapman to collect
postjudgment interest. 5 The statute providing for postjudgment interest on judgments, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 235, section
8, did not apply to an agency of the Commonwealth. 6
Although the Supreme Judicial Court ruled on the issue of the
Commonwealth's liability for interest in contract actions prior to
Chapman, the reasoning in previous decisions invited plaintiffs to
factually distinguish their claims. 7 The holding in Chapman, however,
appears to close the door on all private parties who contract with the
Commonwealth and subsequently seek postjudgment interest. 8 The
Chapman court's conclusion, however, rests on questionable reasoning because 1) the court's reliance on prior case law cannot be reconciled with the facts in Chapmar, and 2) the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes such a result. 9
Part II of this note discusses Chapman and presents the current
state of the law regarding the Commonwealth's liability for postjudg4 See

Chapman, 423 Mass. at 586, 670 N.E.2d at 168 (noting trial court's
reasoning for denying Chapman's motion for postjudgment interest).
' See id. (disagreeing with Chapman's argument that the Commonwealth
must pay postjudgment interest because sovereign immunity is waived in contract
actions).
6 See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 587,
670
N.E.2d 166, 169 (quoting C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass.
390, 393, 486 N.E.2d 54, 56-57 (1985)).
' See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 391, 486 N.E.2d at 55 (1985)
(deciding Commonwealth's liability for interest on a judgment during the time
necessary for the Legislature to appropriate funds to satisfy the judgment); C & R
Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 334 Mass. 232, 233, 135 N.E.2d 539, 540 (1956)
(deciding Commonwealth's liability for interest absent a clause in a contract).
See Chapman, 423 Mass. at 587, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (concluding
Commonwealth not liable for postjudgment interest even when waiver of
sovereign immunity exists on underlying contract claim).
See id.
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ment interest in contract actions.' 0 Part III presents the statutes and
rules that govern postjudgment interest in contract actions in Massachusetts.1 1 Part IV explains the applicability of postjudgment interest
in tort actions and discusses the relevant statutory scheme.12 Part V
discusses the judicial and statutory history of postjudgment interest in
eminent domain actions.' 3 Part VI analyzes the development of the
law in Massachusetts regarding the Commonwealth's liability for
postjudgment interest in contract actions and contrasts the Commonwealth's liability for interest in a contract action with tort and eminent
domain actions. 14
II. CONTRACT ACTIONS

Chapman v. University of MassachusettsMedical Cente

5

is the
law in Massachusetts regarding the Commonwealth's liability for
postjudgment interest.16 In Chapman, the plaintiff, Margaret Chapman, brought an action against the University of Massachusetts
Medical Center ("UMMC"), an agent of the Commonwealth, for
wrongful discharge in breach of an employment contract. 17 The trial
court found that UMMC breached Chapman's contract by wrongfully

'0See infra notes 15-61, and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 62-104, and accompanying text.
,2See infra notes 105-132, and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 133-168, and accompanying text.
4See
infra notes 169-231, and accompanying text.
" 423 Mass. 584, 670 N.E.2d 166 (1996).
16 See Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr.,
Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of
Mental Retardation, 424 Mass. 430, 469, 677 N.E.2d 127, 153 (1997) (stating
postjudgment interest against the Commonwealth requires statutory authority as
directed in Chapman).

" Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 584, 670
N.E.2d 166, 167 (1996). Note the Supreme Judicial Court rendered a decision
regarding Chapman's claim for breach of contract in 1994 in Chapman v.
University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 417 Mass. 104, 628 N.E.2d 8 (1994) [hereinafter
Chapman 1], and decided Chapman's claim for postjudgment interest in 1996 in
Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 670 N.E.2d 166
(1996) [hereinafter Chapman II].
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terminating her. 's The court entered judgment for Chapman on January 10, 1992 for $243,144.25, with interest from the date of commencement of the action, July 20, 1990.19 The Supreme Judicial
Court affirmed the judgment on February 17, 1994.20
On April 19, 1994, the court entered an amended judgment after
rescript awarding Chapman $243,144.25, with interest from July 6,
1986 to the date of judgment in the sum of $163,149.63.21 In addition, the court awarded postjudgment interest from January 10, 1992,
the date of judgment, to the date of judgment after rescript, April 19,
1994, in the sum of $109,969.97.22 An assistant clerk entered the
amended judgment and UMMC did not appeal or attempt to amend
it. 23 The clerk, however, refused to include the postjudgment interest
award in the certificate ofjudgment.24

" Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 584, 670 N.E.2d at 167.
19Id.
20 See Chapman I, 417 Mass. at 105, 628 N.E.2d at 9 (affirming superior
court's decision that UMMC violated Chapman's employment contract).
21

See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 585, 670 N.E.2d at 168 (noting the original

judgment provided for interest from July 20, 1990 but UMMC did not appeal
entry of the earlier date).
The court refers to the interest for this time period, from the commencement
of the action to the date of judgment, as "prejudgment" interest. Id. Two statutes
govern prejudgment interest in contract actions and each statute provides for
interest during separate time periods. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West
Supp. 1999) (stating the clerk shall add interest from the date of commencement
of the action, or date of breach if established, to the verdict); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (stating interest shall be computed upon the verdict to the
time judgment is entered). Prejudgment interest, therefore, is awarded from the
date of commencement of the action, or date of breach, to entry of judgment. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235,
§ 8 (1986).
12 Chapman v. University of Mass. Med.
Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 585, 670
N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996).
23 Id.
24 id.
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Chapman moved for an order requiring inclusion of postjudgment
interest.25 The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that an action
for interest after judgment is a separate action that is not part of the
underlying contract claim. 26 The trial court recognized that postjudgment interest is intended to compensate a party for the loss of use
of money, but the Commonwealth was not liable for postjudgment
interest because no clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity existed.27
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the trial court's reasoning and affirmed in Chapman II28 The issue in Chapman II was
Chapman's entitlement to postjudgment interest. 29 The court concluded that "whether or not a plaintiff's claim for postjudgment interest is brought in a separate action, a claim for postjudgment interest is
noncontractual and must be authorized statutorily., 30 This statement
has the effect of immunizing the Commonwealth from liability for
postjudgment interest in contract actions. 3 ' The court32 relied on and
expanded the holding in C & M ConstructionCo., Inc.

In C & M Construction Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth,33 C & M
recovered $343,407.93, including interest of $101,109.94, on July 3,
1975, on a judgment in a contract action against the Common-

2

5id.

26

Id. at 586, 670 N.E.2d at 168 (relying on C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v.

Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 391-92, 486 N.E.2d 54, 55-56 (1985)).
27 Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 586, 670
N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996).
28

id.

Id. at 585, 670 N.E.2d at 168.
670 N.E.2d at 169.
" See Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of
Mental Retardation, 424 Mass. 430, 469, 677 N.E.2d 127, 153 (1997) (extending
holding in Chapman to include postjudgment costs, namely attorney's fees).
32See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 587, 670
N.E.2d 166, 169 (1996) (declaring the court's decision in C & M Constr. Co.,
Inc. is controlling).
" 396 Mass. 390, 486 N.E.2d 54 (1985).
30 Id.
at 588,
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wealth.3 4
on July 9,
1975 and
proved37 in

The clerk sent a certificate of judgment to the comptroller
1975. 35 An additional budget request was made on July 21,
the appropriation bill that included this request was ap36
1976.
C & M did not receive payment until July 16,

1976.

C & M sought interest from the date of judgment, July 3, 1975,
until the date of payment, July 16, 1976.38 The court issued a money
judgment on the contract action, and the claim for postjudgment interest was a second and separate action filed by C & M. 39 The Supreme Judicial Court considered the Commonwealth's liability for interest during the time necessary for the Legislature to appropriate the
funds. 40 The court held the Commonwealth not liable for postjudgment interest. 4 '
The court recognized a common law waiver of sovereign immunity exists when the Commonwealth enters into a contract with a pri-

See C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 390, 486
N.E.2d 54, 55 (1985) (setting forth the facts).
" See id. at 390-91, 486 N.E.2d at 55. The procedure for payment was
lengthy and satisfaction of the judgment took almost one year. See C & M
Constr. Co., 396 Mass. at 391-92, 486 N.E.2d at 55 (describing the timeline for
payment to C & M). C & M initially received $71,721.61, the balance remaining
on the funds already appropriated for the project. Id. The bureau of building
construction made an additional budget request to the Legislature on July 21,
1975 for the balance owed to C & M to satisfy the judgment. Id. Payment could
not be made until appropriation of the funds. Id.
16 C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 391, 486 N.E.2d
at 55.
14

37 Id

38id.
39id.

Id. The court phrased the issue as "whether the Commonwealth is
accountable for interest on the unsatisfied portion of a judgment during the time
required for the appropriation of funds by the Legislature to satisfy the judgment,
where there is no express statutory authority authorizing such recovery." Id.
4, C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass.
390, 391, 486
40

N.E.2d 54, 55 (1985).
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vate party. 42 An action for interest, however, is a separate action that
requires statutory authorization because it is not part of the underlying contract claim.43 C & M argued the authority for postjudgment
interest was found by reading Massachusetts General Laws chapter
235, section 8 into chapter 258, sections 1-12, the Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act, because chapter 258 is the "primary statutory basis
for the waiver of sovereign immunity." 44 The court rejected this argument because the statutes that provide for postjudgment interest in
private actions, such as chapter 235, section 8, are not expressly incorporated into statutes that permit damages against the Commonwealth, such as chapter 258. 45
4
The court went on to consider issues of statutory construction.
The court looked to the eminent domain statute expressly authorizing
postjudgment interest, chapter 79, section 37.47 If the Legislature
intended to authorize the Commonwealth' s liability for postjudgment
interest under chapter 235, section 8, then enactment of a statute
authorizing postjudgment interest in eminent domain cases would

42

Id. (citing Monadnock Display Fireworks, Inc. v. Andover, 388 Mass.

153, 156-57, 445 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1983)).
41Id. at 392, 486 N.E.2d at 56. The court concluded "the present
action [for
interest] is not founded on the contract between C & M and the Commonwealth,
as to which sovereign immunity is waived." Id.
"Id. Chapter 235, section 8 authorizes postjudgment interest but does not
expressly address the Commonwealth's liability. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235,
§ 8 (1986) (requiring payment of interest until satisfaction of the judgment). The
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act is a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity and
permits a private party to bring a tort action against the Commonwealth. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch 258, §§ 1-12 (1985) (delineating the scope of a litigant's
rights and obligations in a tort action against the Commonwealth).
41 See C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 393,
486
N.E.2d 54, 56 (1985) (citing Broadhurst v. Director of the Div. of Employment
Sec., 373 Mass. 720, 727, 369 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (1973)).
46 See id. at 392, 486 N.E.2d at 56 (examining
whether an alternate source

of waiver exists).
47

See id. at 393, 486 N.E.2d at 56 (citing Woodworth v. Commonwealth,

353 Mass. 229, 230, 230 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1967)); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 79, §
37 (1993) (governing postjudgment interest in eminent domain actions).
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have been unnecessary. 4 The court found the same reasoning disposed of C & M's claim.49
The court makes two assertions to justify the holding in C & M
Construction Co., Inc.5 ° First, an action for postjudgment interest is a
separate action from the underlying claim and requires statutory
authorization. 5 Second, the Legislature did not intend chapter 235,
41 See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 393, 486 N.E.2d at 56
(discussing rules of statutory construction). The court stated:
[A] statute awarding postjudgment interest in eminent domain cases
evinced a legislative intent that [chapter 235, section 8], not be applied
to claims against the Commonwealth... If that were not so, [chapter
235, section 8] would have made the enactment of a separate statute
awarding postjudgment interest in eminent domain cases an unnecessary and redundant legislative gesture. In expressly providing for interest until payment in one type of proceeding, we assume the Legislature meant to "[exclude] by implication other similar matters not
mentioned."
Id. (quoting McArthur Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth, 197 Mass. 137, 139, 83 N.E.
334, 335 (1908)).
Chapter 79, section 37, governing interest in eminent domain actions, is the
only statute that expressly holds the Commonwealth liable for postjudgment
interest. See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 392, 486 N.E.2d at 56
(stating the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act and chapter 235, section 8 do not
authorize postjudgment interest); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1985)
(expressly authorizing postjudgment interest). Prior to enactment of chapter 79,
section 37, recovery for postjudgment interest against the Commonwealth was
prohibited. See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 392, 486 N.E.2d at 56
(noting alternative theories of recovery for postjudgment interest, namely on
constitutional grounds).
49 See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 393, 486 N.E.2d at 56-57
(finding C & M has no claim).
'oSee id. at 391-92, 486 N.E.2d at 55-56 (reasoning the Commonwealth is
not liable for postjudgment interest).
" See id. at 391-92, 486 N.E.2d at 55 (rejecting C & M's argument that the
action for postjudgment interest is part of the underlying contract claim).
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section 8 to apply to the Commonwealth. 5 2 The court in ChapmanII
considers the two assertions and similarly concludes
that the Com53
interest.
postjudgment
for
liable
not
is
monwealth
Chapman attempted to distinguish the facts in C & M Construction Co., Inc. by noting C & M brought a completely separate action
for postjudgment interest, while Chapman's claim was being litigated
in an underlying contract action. 54 The Supreme Judicial Court re52See

id. at 393, 486 N.E.2d at 56 (interpreting the Legislature's intent when

it authorized postjudgment interest in eminent domain actions).
The court also rejected C & M's argument that failure to pay interest was a
wrongful detention of money. See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 394,
486 N.E.2d at 57 (concluding C & M erroneously relied on Perkins Sch. for the
Blind v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 383 Mass. 825, 423 N.E.2d 765 (1981)). The
Commonwealth is liable for postjudgment interest due to wrongful detention of
money if the Commonwealth has not done everything the law requires it to do in
the particular case. See Perkins Sch. for the Blind v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 383
Mass. 825, 831, 423 N.E.2d 765, 770 (1981) (stating interest is payable as
compensation for non-performance of a contract).
The court in C & M Construction Co., Inc. concluded reliance on Perkins
School for the Blind was "misplaced" because a claim for wrongful detention of
money requires an evaluation of the contractual obligations between the parties,
and C & M's claim for postjudgment interest "has no roots in contract." C & M
Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 394, 486 N.E.2d at 57. If Perkins School for the
Blind were applicable, C & M's claim still fails because the court concludes that
the Legislature did everything required to satisfy the judgment. See id. at 394,
486 N.E.2d at 57 (finding C & M cannot succeed on the claim).
" See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 586, 670
N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996) (concluding the Commonwealth's liability for
prejudgment interest does not support a claim for postjudgment interest).
See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 587, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (noting Chapman's
flawed argument). C & M claimed interest due for the time it took the
Legislature to appropriate funds to satisfy the judgment. See C & M Constr. Co.,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 391, 486 N.E.2d 54, 55 (1985) (setting
forth the question presented). The postjudgment interest C & M sought to
recover was for the time period between the judgment (there was no appeal in the
contract case) and payment. Id. Chapman sought interest from the date of
judgment to the date of judgment after rescript. See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at
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jected this argument and stated "the distinction is without significance."55 Liability for postjudgment interest is noncontractual even if
the underlying claim is based on contract, therefore no common law

waiver of sovereign immunity exists for a claim to interest. .6 Further,
the Legislature did not intend to create a statutory waiver 7of sovereign immunity for postjudgment interest in contract actions."
Chapman II represents Massachusetts law on the issue of the
Commonwealth's liability for postjudgment interest in contract actions. 58 The common law waiver of sovereign immunity that exists at
the time the government enters into a contract does not encompass
liability for postjudgment interest. 59 The general laws do not provide

585, 670 N.E.2d at 168 (explaining the clerk refused to include postjudgment
interest in the execution and Chapman filed a motion for interest).
" Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 587, 670 N.E.2d at 169.
56 See id. (highlighting no statutory authority for postjudgment interest
exists).

See id. (quoting the reasoning in Falmouth Hosp. v. Commissioner of Pub.
Welfare, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 548 n.6, 503 N.E.2d 1322, 1324 (1987)). The
Legislature intended chapter 235, section 8 not apply to the Commonwealth, as
evidenced by the inclusion of postjudgment interest in the eminent domain
statutes. See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 587, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (quoting C & M
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 393, 486 N.E.2d 54, 56
(1985)).
" See Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of
Mental Retardation, 424 Mass. 430, 469, 677 N.E.2d 127, 153 (1997) (relying on
Chapman II to deny postjudgment costs against the Commonwealth); Chapman v.
University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 586, 670 N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996)
(holding Commonwealth not liable for postjudgment interest in contract actions).
Although the Commonwealth is not liable for postjudgment interest absent
statutory authority, the government may extend the scope of its consent to suit by
expressly agreeing to pay postjudgment interest as a term in a contract. See
Monadnock Display Fireworks, Inc. v. Andover, 388 Mass. 153, 156-57, 445
N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1983) (stating a contract creates duties that do not otherwise
exist).
'9See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 588, 670
N.E.2d 166, 169 (1996) (concluding a claim for postjudgment interest is
noncontractual and must be authorized by statute).
17
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the necessary waiver to expressly hold the Commonwealth liable in a
contract action.60 Although the reasoning in C & M Construction
Co., Inc. left the door open for Chapman's claim to the extent that C
& M's claim was truly a separate action for postjudgment interest, the
Supreme
Judicial Court in Chapman H1 closed and bolted the door
1
shut.

6

III. STATUTES AND RULES
Interest on judgments is governed by statute.62 Private parties to
a contract may negotiate a rate of interest in the event of nonpayment,
but interest owed in a dispute reduced to judgment is governed by the
legislature. 63 A government's liability for interest on a judgment in a
contract action requires: 1) a statute authorizing interest in contract
actions; and 2) a statutory or common law waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to interest.64 The court in Chapman H held the
general interest statutes that apply to judgments in favor of private
parties do not apply to the Commonwealth because no waiver of sovereign immunity exists.65 The court expressly and implicitly relied on

60See C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 392, 486
N.E.2d 54, 56 (highlighting only one Massachusetts statute expressly authorizes
postjudgment interest against the Commonwealth).
61 See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 587, 670
N.E.2d at 169 (stating it is

irrelevant whether a claim for postjudgment interest is brought as a motion or as
a separate action).
62See Date of Verdict or Date of Entry of Judgment Thereof as
Beginning of
Interest Period on Judgment, 1 A.L.R. 479 § 1 (1948) (pointing to common law
principle that judgments do not accrue interest absent statutory regulation).
63See Morley v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 162, 168 (1892)
(concluding the United States Constitution mandates a plaintiff's right to interest
be prescribed by the state legislature).
64See generally Date of Verdict or Date of Entry of Judgment Thereof as
Beginning ofInterest Periodon Judgment, 1 A.L.R. 479 §§ 1, 2 (1948) (declaring
states differ on the question of whether general interest statutes apply to
governmental units absent a statute or a contract).
65See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584,
586, 670
N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996) (agreeing with the superior court's reasoning).

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATEADVOCACY [Vol. IV

106

existing Massachusetts interest statutes and the relationships between
these statutes.6 6

A. Chapter235, § 8
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 235, section 8 establishes
when postjudgment interest begins to accrue and the rate of interest. 67
The statute provides in pertinent part that "[e]very judgment for the
payment of money shall bear interest from the day of its entry."68
Postjudgment interest accrual begins at entry of "judgment" and
ceases at the time of payment. 69 A "judgment" includes a decree and

"See id. at 587-88, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (discussing the relevant statutory
scheme).
67 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986)
(providing for both
prejudgment and postjudgment interest). The statute states in full:
When judgment is rendered upon an award of county commissioners, a
committee or referees, or upon the report of an auditor or master, or
upon the verdict of a jury or the finding of a justice, interest shall be
computed upon the amount of the award, report, verdict or finding
from the time when made to the time the judgment is entered [prejudgment interest]. Every judgment for the payment of money shall
bear interest from the day of its entry at the same rate per annum as
provided for prejudgment interest in such award, report, verdict or
finding. The warrant or execution issued on a judgment for the payment of money shall specify the day upon which judgment is entered,
and shall require the collection or satisfaction thereof with interest
from the day of its entry.
Id.
6

ch. 235, § 8 (1986).
id. (stating the warrant or execution shall require satisfaction of the

MASS. GEN. LAWS

69See

judgment with interest from the day of entry); see also MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(f)
(1998) (requiring every judgment bears interest until the date of payment).
Rule 54(f) requires the clerk of the court to compute the interest for two distinct
time periods: 1) up to the date of entry of judgment; and 2) from the date of entry
of judgment to the date of execution ordering payment. MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(f)
(1998). A judgment debtor is also liable for interest during a third time period,
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is separate from the award, report, verdict or finding. 70 Massachusetts General Laws chapter 235, section 8, provides that "judgment is
rendered [after issuance of] an award of county commissioners, a
committee or referees, or upon the report of an auditor or master, or
upon the verdict of a jury or the finding of a justice., 71 A "judgment," therefore, follows a jury verdict or a master's report and is a
separate act or decree. 72 Chapter 235, section 8 entitles a party to
interest on a judgment regardless of the type of action.73
B. Rule 54
Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 54 clarifies the procedure
outlined in chapter 235, section 8 that prescribes interest to a successful plaintiff.74 The rule defines "judgment" and "final judgment"

from the date of execution to the date of payment. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, §
8 (1986); MASS. R. COv. P. 54(f) (1998).
Rule 54(f) does not direct the clerk to compute interest for the latter time
period because the clerk cannot know the date of payment at the time the
execution is issued. MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(f) (1998). The absence of this
formality, however, does not excuse the judgment debtor's liability for interest up
until the date of payment. See MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(f) (1998) (stating "every
judgment for the payment of money shall bear interest up to the date of payment
of said judgment").
70 See MASS. R. Clv. P. 54(a) (1998) (describing the terms "judgment" and
"final judgment"). A "judgment" or "final judgment" includes judgments entered
upon, among other things, verdicts of a jury, or special or general verdicts. MASS.
R. Civ. P. 54(a)(2) (1998).
71MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986).
72See MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (1998) (setting forth instances when the clerk
may enter judgment without direction of the court and where court approval of
the form of judgment is required).
73See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1994) (dictating the award of interest
on judgments).
74See MASS. R. Civ. P. 54 (1998) (defining "judgment" and directing the
clerk to compute interest). Rule 54(f) states in full:
Every judgment for the payment of money shall bear interest up to the
date of payment of said judgment. Interest accrued up to the date of
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to "mean the act of the trialcourt finally adjudicating the rights of the
parties affected by the judgment. 75 This definition has a significant
impact on the rights of the parties to a suit if one of the parties is not
liable for postjudgment interest.76 Rule 54(f) directs the clerk to
compute the amount of postjudgment interest and include this amount
on the certificate of payment or execution. 77 Rule 54(f) also designates the separate time periods for prejudgment and postjudgment
interest.78

entry of a judgment shall be computed by the clerk according to law.
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, interest from the date of entry
of a judgment to the date of execution or order directing the payment
of said judgment shall also be computed by the clerk, and the amount
of such interest shall be stated on the execution or order.
Id.
7 MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (1998) (emphasis added). Prior
to 1973
amendments, "judgment" meant the final adjudicating act where appellate review
had been exhausted. Reporter's Notes, MASS. R. Civ. P. 54 (1998). Prior to the
amendments, a case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court went to "judgment"
and postjudgment interest would accrue from the date of the Supreme Judicial
Court's "judgment" to the date of payment. Id. In accordance with the 1973
amendments, "judgment" was issued by the trial court, notwithstanding an
appeal. Id. This sets the postjudgment interest period as the period between the
judgment by the trial court and payment. MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (1998).
Redefining "judgment" significantly extends the "postjudgment" period. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (stating "the warrant or execution issued
on a judgment ... shall require the.., satisfaction thereof with interest from the
day of its [the judgment's] entry); see also Stokosa v. Waltuch, 378 Mass. 617,
619-20, 393 N.E.2d 350, 351 (1979) (noting under the 1973 definition the time
period between judgment and payment could be years, while under the prior
definition, the time period was much shorter).
76 See Stokosa, 378 Mass. at 619-20, 393 N.E.2d at 351 (discussing the
practical effect of the 1973 amendment to Rule 54).
71See MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(f) (1998).
'8See MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(f) (1998) (designating the time periods without
direct reference to the terms "prejudgment" and "postjudgment"). The 1986
Reporter's Notes state "[t]he initial entry of judgment by the trial court should be
the sum of the verdict and interest on that verdict to the time of said entry
[prejudgment interest]. Postjudgment interest should be computed on that total."
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C Chapter231, § 6C
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 231, section 6C provides in
a contract action, "upon a verdict, finding or order for judgment for
pecuniary damages, interest shall be added by the clerk of the court to
the amount of damages . . from the date of breach or demand. 79

The function of section 6C is to provide interest to a successful litigant from the date of breach or filing of the action to the verdict,
finding or order.S' Section 6C expressly addresses the method of calculating interest in actions against the Commonwealth from the time
of breach or filing of the action to the verdict, finding or order."' The
express reference to the Commonwealth in section 6C is not a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, but rather a recognition of the
common law
waiver that exists when the Commonwealth enters into a
82
contract.
D. An Example Calculationof PostjudgmentInterest
The facts of Chapman II illustrate the relationships between the
Massachusetts interest statutes applicable in contract actions. 83

Reporter's Notes, MASS. R. Ov. P. 54(f) (1986) (citing Charles D. Bonanno
Linen Service, Inc. v. McCarthy, 550 F. Supp. 231, 248 (D. Mass. 1982); Boston
Edison v. Tritsch, 370 Mass. 260, 266, 346 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1976)).
'9 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West Supp. 1999).
80 See

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West Supp. 1999) (requiring the

clerk to add interest to damages at a specified rate). The clerk must compute
interest from the date of breach if known. Id. If the date of breach is not known,
the clerk computes interest from the date of commencement of the action. Id.
"' See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West Supp. 1999) (requiring the
clerk to calculate interest at the contract rate, if established, or pursuant to the
method described in chapter 231, section 61).
82 See Sargeant v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 383 Mass. 808, 814, 822,
423 N.E.2d 755, 760, 764 (198 1) (explaining the Commonwealth is treated in the
same manner as a private person in a contract action and therefore liable for
interest under chapter 23 1, section 6C).
83 See

Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 584, 670
N.E.2d 166, 167 (1996) (explaining the facts).
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Chapman filed her contract claim on July 20, 1990.84 For purposes of

this example, the judge's finding for damages was issued on January
3, 1992, in favor of Chapman for $243,144.25.85 The trial court entered judgment on January 10, 1992.86 On direct appeal, the Supreme
Judicial Court entered an amended judgment after rescript on April
19, 1994 in favor of Chapman for damages of $243,144.25.87
The interest statutes applicable in contract actions provide for
interest during three time periods. 88 Chapter 231, section 6C requires
the clerk to add interest to damages from the date of the commencement of the action, July 20, 1990, to the date of the trial court's findings, January 3, 1992.89 In accordance with the rate specified in
chapter 231, section 6C, Chapman's interest accrues on $243,144.25
in damages from July 20, 1990 to January 3, 1992, or an amount
equal to approximately $42,000.00. 90 Section 6C requiresthe clerk
4Id.
" See id. (omitting the date of the court's findings). Chapman waived her
right to a jury trial but the decision by the court in Chapman II does not indicate
the date the court issued its findings. Id. Note also that for purposes of
calculation, a verdict, finding or order for judgment for pecuniary damages are
treated the same. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West Supp. 1999)
(providing interest is added by the clerk "upon a verdict, finding or order for
judgment for pecuniary damages").
86 See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 584, 670 N.E.2d
at 167 (explaining the
facts).
17Id. at 585, 670 N.E.2d
at 168.
" See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West Supp. 1999)
(providing for interest from commencement of action to date of verdict or
finding); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (providing for prejudgment and
postjudgment interest).
" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West Supp. 1999) (stating that
"upon a... finding ....
interest shall be added by the clerk.., to the amount of
damages.. from the date of the breach or demand").
90See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West Supp. 1999) (delineating the
interest rate as the contract rate if specified or 12% per year). The court in
Chapman II presented an interest figure of $42,995.48 and this included interest
from the date of commencement of the action to the date of judgment. See
Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 584-85, 670 N.E.2d
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to include interest from the date of breach or the date of commencement of the action to the finding or verdict. 9'

The first provision of chapter 235, section 8 authorizes interest
from the time of the finding of the trial court, January 3, 1992, to the
entry ofjudgment on January 10, 1992.92 Interest is calculated based
on the amount of the finding plus interest accrued pursuant to chapter
231, section 6C, or $285,144.25 ($243,144.25 + $42,000.00). 93 The

interest that accrues from January 3, 1992 to January 10, 1992 at
12% per year on $285,144.25 is approximately $900.00. 94 The interest that accrues during the period between the finding or verdict and
entry of judgment shall be referred to as "prejudgment" interest for
the remainder of this note and is governed by chapter 235, section 8. 9'
The court enters judgment upon the finding for $286,044.25. 96
The second provision of chapter 235, section 8, authorizes interest

166, 167-68 (1996) (describing the nature of Chapman's action). This figure
reflects the interest calculated pursuant to both chapter 231, section 6C and
chapter 235, section 8, because interest is calculated up to entry of judgment. Id.
9' See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6C (West Supp. 1999) (stating "interest
shall be added by the clerk of the court").
92 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (providing
interest is computed
upon the finding from the time made to the time of judgment).
9'See R.H. White Realty Co., Inc. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 371 Mass. 452,
454, 358 N.E.2d 440, 441 (1976) (clarifying the procedure for adding interest to a
verdict). The Supreme Judicial Court stated that chapter 235, section 8 was
necessary for the calculation of interest because other interest statutes only
"provided for the addition of interest to the amount of a verdict." R.H. White
Realty Co., Inc., 371 Mass. at 454, 358 N.E.2d at 441. The interest from the date
of breach, or date of commencement of the action, is added to the verdict and this
amount accrues interest to the date of judgment. See id. (quoting Nugent v.
Boston Consol. Gas Co., 238 Mass. 221, 238, 130 N.E. 488, 494 (1921)).
94 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (providing for payment of
prejudgment interest).
9' See id. (providing interest from the verdict or finding to the entry of
judgment, although not designated as "prejudgment" interest).
96 See 1986 Reporter's Notes, MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(f)
(1998) (stating
judgment by the trial court should include the sum of the verdict and interest on
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from the date of entry of judgment, January 10, 1992, to the date of
payment. 97 For purposes of this illustration, the date of payment is
May 1, 1994, a date after the date of entry of judgment after rescript. 9s The court issues a writ of execution to enforce the payment
of the judgment after rescript. 99 Chapter 235, section 8 requires the
execution to specify the date of entry of judgment and that the judgment debtor pay interest from the date of entry until satisfaction of
the judgment.' 00 The interest that accrues from the date of entry of
judgment to the date of payment is postjudgment interest.10 1 Disregarding the holding in Chapman 1H for purposes of this illustration,
UMMC is liable for postjudgment interest on $286,044.25, from the
date of judgment, January 10, 1992, to May 1, 1994, the date of
payment. 102

the verdict to the time of entry of judgment). The amount entered on the
judgment includes the sum of a) the amount of the finding ($243,144.25); plus b)
interest from the date of commencement of the action to the finding in
accordance with chapter 231, section 6C ($42,000.00); plus c) interest that
accrues on the amount of (a) plus (b) ($285,144.25), from the date of the finding
to the entry of judgment, in accordance with chapter 235, section 8 ($900.00).
9'See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (requiring payment of interest
from the date of entry of judgment until satisfaction of the judgment).
9' See MASS. R. CIv. P. 54 (1998) (stating court enters judgment after the
verdict or finding).
" See MASS. R. Civ. P. 69 (1998) (setting forth that a writ of execution is
required to enforce a judgment for the payment of money unless directed
otherwise by the court). Note in Chapman II, the clerk of the court refused to
issue an execution that included postjudgment interest from the date of entry of
judgment to the date of judgment after rescript. See Chapman v. University of
Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 585, 670 N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996) (noting the
clerk's refusal prompted Chapman's motion for the additional interest).
'ooSee MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986).

'o'See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 585, 670
N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996) (explaining clerk's refusal to include postjudgment
interest in writ of execution).
'02See 1986 Reporter's Notes, MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(t) (1998) (stating
postjudgment interest is calculated on the sum of the finding and interest on the
finding to the time of entry of the finding).
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A private party must pay the interest that accrues during this
twenty-nine month period.1"3 Applying the holding in Chapman II,
however, UMMC
as a government entity is not liable for postjudg04
'
interest.
ment
IV.

TORT ACTIONS

The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") governs the issue
of postjudgment interest against the Commonwealth in tort actions. 105
The MTCA provides for the rights of a private party in an action
against the Commonwealth but limits the state's liability. 1 6 Prior to
1978, private parties could not bring a tort action against public entities without the Commonwealth's consent. 0 7 A general rule of law
exists "that the Commonwealth 'cannot be impleaded in its own
courts except with its consent, and, when that consent is granted, it
can be impleaded only in the manner and to the extent expressed...
[by] statute."",10 8 The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the
Commonwealth from suit therefore the government's consent is necessary. 109

'03See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (requiring payment of
prejudgment and postjudgment interest).

See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 586, 670 N.E.2d at 168 (holding
Commonwealth not accountable for postjudgment interest).
"4

,05
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-12 (1985) (setting forth the MTCA);
Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 657, 584 N.E.2d 619,
619 (1992) (deciding whether postjudgment interest is recoverable under the
MTCA).
06
'
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (1985) (limiting damages to $100,000
and precluding recovery of punitive damages and prejudgment interest).
107 See Jonathan
P. Feltner & Mary M. Logalbo, Claims Against
Governmental Defendants: Chapter 258 Entities, the MBTA and Other Public
Bodies, MASS. CONT. L. EDUC. 5-1 (Motor Vehicle Torts) (1996) (describing
evolution of government tort exposure).
'o' See General Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 661, 664, 110
N.E.2d 101, 102 (1953) (quoting Glickman v. Commonwealth, 244 Mass. 148,
149-50, 138 N.E. 252, 253 (1923)).
'09
See Onofrio, 411 Mass. at 658, 584 N.E.2d at 620 (holding sovereign
immunity prevents recovery of postjudgment interest in tort actions).
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A. Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States has its
roots in English common law and was justified by "[t]he inherent nature of sovereignty" with the protection of the king as its primary
purpose. "l The concept, however, came under disfavor with the judiciary and the public."' In Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth,"l2 the Supreme Judicial Court concluded the doctrine of sovereign immunity was "logically indefensible" and noted that some jurisdictions have completely abolished the concept." 3
"oEmployees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, Mo. v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 288 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting Great No. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944)).
..See Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 618, 296
N.E.2d 461, 465 (1973) (discussing the origins of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity). The Court recognized the continued existence of the concept of
sovereign immunity but noted that "[s]cholarly treatises have suggested that the
doctrine is an anachronism in American law, but despite its tautological
justification, the doctrine continues to enjoy current vitality." Id.
112 363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d
461 (1973).
...See Morash & Sons. Inc., 363 Mass. at 618, 296 N.E.2d at 465
(discussing the erosion of the concept of sovereign immunity in all jurisdictions
through statutory or judge made exceptions). The judiciary has the authority to
abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity without the consent or approval of
the Legislature because the concept is judicially created. See Whitney v.
Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 212, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (1977) (stating "we have
no doubt as to our power to abrogate the doctrine of governmental immunity").
Legislative action, however, will almost always follow judicial action regarding
governmental immunity, therefore the court prefers the Legislature reach finality.
See id. at 210, 366 N.E.2d at 1212 (recognizing the overlapping legislative and
judicial powers regarding immunity and the Legislature "will have the final
word").
Note the court in Whitney decided a question of municipal immunity and
not state immunity. See id. at 210, 366 N.E.2d at 1212 (announcing its intention
to abrogate the doctrine of municipal immunity in the first appropriate case). At
common law, municipalities, unlike state entities, were subject to liability for tort
actions involving commercial functions. See Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass.
387, 390, 114 N.E. 722, 724 (1939) (stating municipal liability may exist if the
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In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court demanded the Legislature
abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity in tort actions." 4 The
court stated the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a "convoluted
scheme of rules and exceptions which have developed over the years
[and is] unjust and indefensible as a matter of logic and sound public
policy.""' 5 The court observed that no legislation existed that addressed its concerns regarding the abrogation of the concept. 116 As a
result of the Legislature's inaction, the court stated its intention to
abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the next appropriate
case unless the Legislature took action. 1 7 The Legislature acted

tortious act included an element of corporate benefit or pecuniary profit such as
operating a public bath house or swimming pool). The differences between
municipal and state immunity do not affect the analysis of this note because the
MTCA eliminates the distinction between government activities and commercial
activities. See Joseph W. Glannon, The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act: Analysis
and Update, 75 MASS. L. REV. 52, 58 (1990) (discussing the MTCA's affect on
common law principles of immunity).
114 See Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass.
208, 210, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1212
(1977) (highlighting the Legislature's inability to abrogate the doctrine of
sovereign immunity for the four years since Morash & Sons, Inc. was decided).
"5 Whitney, 373 Mass. at 209, 366 N.E.2d at 1211.
6 See id. at 210, 366 N.E.2d at 1212 (noting the Legislature's inability to
reate a "workable solution").
'" See id. at 210, 366 N.E.2d at 1212 (discussing the court's intention to act
definitively and swiftly). The court stated:
[W]e state our intention to abrogate the doctrine of municipal immunity in the first appropriate case decided by this court after the conclusion of the next (1978) session of the Legislature, provided that the
Legislature at that time has not itself acted definitively as to the doctrine. Thereafter, when appropriate cases concerning State and county
immunity are presented, it is our intention to take similar action to abrogate immunity.
Id. at 210, 366 N.E.2d at 1210.
At the time Whitney was decided, only five states in the nation retained the
common law protection of sovereign immunity at the state and local levels in tort
actions. See Whitney, 373 Mass. at 212, 366 N.E.2d at 1213 (summarizing the
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quickly and passed the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act."'
The
MTCA provides a limited statutory waiver of sovereign immunity but
does not encompass a waiver for the payment of postjudgment interest. 119
B. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act
The Supreme Judicial Court settled the question of postjudgment
interest in tort actions in a 1992 decision interpreting the MTCA. 20
The MTCA expressly provides that public employers are not liable for
prejudgment interest, but contains no language regarding liability for
postjudgment interest. 12' The plaintiff in Onofrio v. Department of
Mental Health 22 argued that by expressly barring recovery of prejudgment interest, the Legislature's silence regarding postjudgment
interest implied that no bar existed for recovery of interest after
judgment.12 The court agreed that Onofio's argument might suc24
ceed if the MTCA were not a statute waiving sovereign immunity. 1

viability of the concept of sovereign immunity in the fifty states). The court
recognized its power to change the law in Massachusetts, particularly since "the
time for change [was] long overdue." Id.
"' See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-12 (1978) (providing limited
liability against the Commonwealth).
"9 See Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 658, 584
N.E.2d 619, 620 (1992) (holding MTCA does not provide a limited statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity for postjudgment interest).
"20
See Onofrio, 411 Mass. at 658, 584 N.E.2d at 620 (holding government
entities are not liable for postjudgment interest in tort actions).
.2 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (1978) (stating public employers

"shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment").
122411 Mass. 657, 584 N.E.2d
619 (1992).
12 See id. at 659, 584 N.E.2d at 620 (rejecting Onofrio's argument that the
court should apply "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" as a rule of statutory
construction in these circumstances).
124 See id. at 659, 584 N.E.2d at 620 (noting the rules of construction
regarding statutes waiving sovereign immunity require special analysis).
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Statutes governing waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly
125
construed and the rules of statutory construction are stringent.
Massachusetts courts require complete or partial waivers of sovereign
immunity be expressed in a provision of a statute or by necessary implication from a statute. 126 Although the Supreme Judicial Court has
expressed disdain for the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court
preserves the viability of the concept in instances where27the Legislature has not expressly and clearly waived its application. 1
The Legislature recognized a right of action for tort claims but
did not include within a private party's rights the authorization to recover postjudgment interest.128 At common law, sovereign immunity

12 See

id. at 659, 584 N.E.2d at 620 (quoting Ware v. Commonwealth, 409

Mass. 89, 91, 564 N.E.2d 998, 999 (1991); C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 392, 486 N.E.2d 54, 56 (1985) (emphasizing the
rules of statutory construction regarding waivers of sovereign immunity are well
established); Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 42, 423
N.E.2d 782, 784 (1981) (determining whether statute designating certain rights
for patients obtaining care from the Department of Health requires the
Commonwealth to pay damages for a denial of those rights).
,26 See Onofrio, 411 Mass. at 659, 584 N.E.2d at 620 (explaining the reasons
for a narrow construction of statutory waivers of sovereign immunity); Ware v.
Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 89, 91, 564 N.E.2d 998, 999 (1991) (recognizing
chapter 258 does not expressly preclude recovery of costs against the
Commonwealth, however rules of statutory construction require an express
waiver of sovereign immunity); C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396
Mass. 390, 392-93, 486 N.E.2d 54, 56 (1985) (stating no statutory authority for
payment of postjudgment interest exists in chapter 235 or chapter 258).
"2See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 586, 670
N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996) (holding Commonwealth not liable for postjudgment
interest because no express statutory waiver exists); Broadhurst v. Director of the
Div. of Employment Sec., 373 Mass. 720, 723-24, 369 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (1977)
(stating Commonwealth not liable for costs of litigation because no statutory
waiver exists); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 619, 296
N.E.2d 461, 465-66 (1973) (stating the doctrine of governmental immunity is
"logically indefensible").
128

See

MASS. GEN. LAWS

ch. 258, § 2 (1985) (excluding recovery of

prejudgment interest but remaining silent regarding postjudgment interest).
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protects the Commonwealth from tort liability.' 2 9 The MTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and defines the scope of
the government's consent to suit in tort. 30 A private party litigant
instituting a tort claim against the Commonwealth must look to the
statute, the MTCA, to determine his rights because the common law
principle of immunity protects the government from tort claims."'3 In
Massachusetts, a private party may not recover postjudgment interest
in a tort action against the Commonwealth because such a claim for
interest is beyond the scope of the limited waiver of sovereign immunity. 132

V. EMINENT DOMAIN ACTIONS

The issue of postjudgment interest against the Commonwealth in
eminent domain actions is governed by chapter 79 of the Massachusetts General Laws. 33 Chapter 79 delineates the rights of a private

129

See Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 621, 296

N.E.2d 461, 467 (1973) (criticizing the rule that the Commonwealth is protected
by immunity and stating that government liability is the exception to the rule).
130 See Jonathan P. Feltner & Mary
M. Logalbo, Claims Against
Governmental Defendants: Chapter 258 Entities, the MBTA and Other Public
Bodies, MASS. CONT. L. EDUC. 5-1 (Motor Vehicle Torts) (1996) (explaining the

MTCA does not provide a complete waiver of immunity and limits the
government's liability).
"' See Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 659, 584
N.E.2d 619, 620 (1992) (explaining waivers of immunity must be expressed in a
statute); Ware v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 89, 90, 564 N.E.2d 998, 998 (1991)
(stating awarding costs to a private party must be based on affirmative authority).
.32
See Onofrio, 411 Mass. at 659, 584 N.E.2d at 620 (finding no provision

in the MTCA permitting postjudgment interest expressly or by implication).
131See

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (outlining procedures for
awarding interest on damages in eminent domain actions). Section 37 states in
pertinent part:
A judgment, whether against the commonwealth or any other body
politic or corporate, shall bear interest at the rate of ten per cent per
annum from the date of the entry of such judgment to an including the
last day of the month prior to the month in which such judgment is
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party when the government seizes land by eminent domain. 134 Sovereign immunity does not protect the Commonwealth from an eminent
domain action because the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution requires that a private party be given just compensation
for a taking. 3 ' At common law, however, interest on a taking was
not an absolute right.136 Similar to a common law tort action, the
Commonwealth is not liable for interest unless a waiver of immunity
exists. 137 Chapter 79 provides a limited waiver of immunity and expressly authorizes postjudgment
interest against the Commonwealth
8
13
actions.
domain
in eminent

A. HistoricalParadigm

Chapter 79 authorizes recovery of interest from the time of the
taking to the time of satisfaction of the judgment. 139 Chapter 79,
however, did not always contemplate the state would be liable for
postjudgment interest. 140 In General Elecfric Co. v. Common-

satisfied, except that a judgment against the commonwealth shall not
bear interest if it is satisfied within thirty days of such entry.

Id.

114
See MASS. GEN.

ch. 79, §§ 1-45 (1993) (setting forth the rights and
obligations of the parties in an eminent domain action).
,' See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring just compensation for a taking).
The Fifth Amendment states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Id.
,16See Norcross v. Cambridge, 166 Mass. 508, 512, 44 N.E. 615, 616 (1896)
(finding interest on damages at common law was not allowed).
131 See General Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth,
329 Mass. 661, 664, 110
N.E.2d 101, 102 (1953) (explaining the Commonwealth can only be impleaded in
its courts to the extent it consents to suit).
,31See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (authorizing interest from the
date of judgment to satisfaction of judgment).
""9See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (stating a judgment against the
Commonwealth or other body politic bears interest until satisfied).
140 See General Elec. Co., 329 Mass. at 663, 110
N.E.2d at 102 (holding
chapter 79 does not require the Commonwealth to pay postjudgment interest).
LAWS
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wealth,14 ' General Electric claimed interest for a taking for the period

between the judgment and payment of the judgment. 142 The court
denied interest based on qualification language contained in chapter
79, section 37.143 At the time of the decision, section 37 stated that
damages bore interest from the time of judgment until paid, "except
as herein otherwise provided."' 144 This qualification language led the
court to examine other statutory provisions relating to damages to
determine if an exception for interest existed for the Commonwealth. 141
The court concluded that application of section 37 required the
use of chapter 258, section 3.146 Section 3 did not address the issue
14' 329

Mass. 661, 110 N.E.2d 101 (1953).
See General Elec. Co., 329 Mass. at 662, 110 N.E.2d at 102 (explaining

142

General Electric did not cause the delay in payment).
143 See id. at 663, 110 N.E.2d at 102 (maintaining
the qualification language
in section 37 prohibits recovery of postjudgment interest).
'4" MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1953).
Section 37, as it read in 1953,
stated in pertinent part, "[d]amages under this chapter shall bear interest at the
rate of four per cent per annum from the date as of which they are assessed until
paid, except as herein otherwise provided." Id. (emphasis added).
'41 See General Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth,
329 Mass. 661, 663, 110
N.E.2d 101, 102 (1953) (reading section 37 in conjunction with other damages
statutes).

'" See id. (maintaining the qualification language of section 37 required the
court to examine other statutes). The qualification language led the court to first
examine other provisions in chapter 79 regarding damages and the court
concluded that section 22 applied. See id. (demonstrating section 22 applied
because the provision addressed the issue of damages against the
Commonwealth). Section 22 states "[j]udgment shall be entered and execution
issue as in actions at law; and when the commonwealth is liable for the damages
the amount found due shall be certified and paid under section three of chapter
two hundred andfifty eight." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 22 (1953) (emphasis
added).
Section 22 directed the court to examine chapter 258, section 3, found at
1932 Mass. Acts ch. 180. See GeneralElec. Co., 329 Mass. at 663, 110 N.E.2d

at 102 (quoting the relevant statutory authority).
chapter 258, section 3 stated:

At the time of judgment,
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of interest and only provided for Costs.147 The court concluded that
the exclusion of interest from section 3 fell directly within the qualification language of section 37, "except as herein otherwise provided."' 148 Chapter 79, section 22 and chapter 258, section 3 were
necessary for the application of chapter 79, section 37 and these statutes did not expressly authorize postjudgment interest against the
Commonwealth. 149 The court concluded absent express statutory
authorization, the Commonwealth need not pay postjudgment interest

in an eminent domain action. "0
B. The Legislature Takes Action
The common law protection of sovereign immunity relied on in
General Electric Co. v. Commonwealth regarding postjudgment interest in eminent domain actions has been waived through legislative

If the final decision is in favor of the petitioner, the chief justice of the
superior court shall certify the amount found due, with the legal costs,
to the comptroller who shall notify the governor, and the governor
shall draw his warrant for such amount on the state treasurer, who shall
pay the same from any appropriations made for the purpose by the
general court.
1932 Mass. Acts ch. 180, § 41. Note that "chapter 258" discussed in General
Electric Co. is not the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act which was passed in 1978.
See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-12 (1978) (setting forth the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act).
,41See 1932 Mass. Acts ch. 180, § 41 (stating the superior court shall
include costs when calculating the amount found due).
148 See General Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass.
661, 663, 110
N.E.2d 101, 102 (1953) (finding the absence of an interest provision in section 22
or section 3 dispositive on the issue of interest under section 79).
149 See id. at 664, 110 N.E.2d at 102 (applying general
principles and rules
of statutory construction).
"0See id. (noting the Commonwealth may only be impleaded in its courts to
the extent the government consents).
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action. 5 ' The Legislature amended chapter 79, sections 22 and 37,
and added section 3A to chapter 258 in 1964.152 The amendments,
functioning together, provided express statutory authorization for
postjudgment interest against the Commonwealth in eminent domain
actions. 153 Today, authorization for postjudgment interest against the

'-, See generally Woodworth v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 229, 230, 230
N.E.2d 814, 815 (1967) (recognizing chapter 79 mandates judgments against the
Commonwealth carry interest until paid).
,2' See id. (noting the change in the law regarding postjudgment interest
since GeneralElec. Co. v. Commonwealth).

The Legislature eventually repealed section 3A of chapter 258 in 1978 and
amended section 22 of chapter 79 in 1981 making section 37 the exclusive
authority for postjudgment interest against the Commonwealth in eminent
domain actions. See 1982 Mass. Acts ch. 634, § 8 (deleting language referring to
chapter 258, section 3A); 1978 Mass. Acts ch. 512, § 15 (repealing section 3A).
qualification language found in chapter 79, section 37. See 1964 Mass. Acts ch.
548, § 2 (striking the phrase "except as herein otherwise provided").
The 1964 amendment to section 22 stated damages against the
Commonwealth "shall be certified and paid under section 3A of chapter two
hundred and fifty-eight." 1964 Mass. Acts ch. 548, § 1 (emphasis added).
Section 3A of chapter 258 required interest against the Commonwealth be
determined in accordance with section 37 of chapter 79. See 1964 Mass. Acts ch.
548, § 4 (requiring payment of interest as authorized by section 37). Section 3A
read in pertinent part:
The governor shall draw his warrant for such amount on the state
treasurer, who shall pay the same, with such interest as is authorized
by the third sentence of section thirty-seven of chapter seventy-nine,

from any appropriation made for the purpose by the general court.
Id.

The third sentence of section 37 read:
A judgment, whether against the commonwealth or any other body
politic or corporate, shall bear interest at the rate of six per cent per
annum from the date of the entry of such judgment to and including
the last day of the month prior to the month in which satisfaction
thereof is paid.

1999] POSTJUDGMENTINTERESTIN CONTRACTACTIONS

123

Commonwealth is found exclusively in section 37. 14 Section 37 provides a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity regarding postjudg-

ment interest in eminent domain actions. 155
C. ConstitutionalIssues
The Commonwealth's liability for postjudgment interest in eminent domain actions has also been justified on constitutional
grounds. 156 In Woodworth v. Commonwealth,17 the court recognized the federal and Massachusetts constitutions require compensation for property taken by eminent domain and decided whether compensation includes interest when the property owner does not receive

1964 Mass. Acts. Ch. 548, § 2.
GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (stating a judgment against the
Commonwealth bears interest until satisfied); C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 392, 486 N.E.2d 54, 56 (1985) (asserting section
37 is the only statute expressly authorizing postjudgment interest against the
Commonwealth). Section 37 states in pertinent part:
'M SeeMASS.

A judgment, whether against the commonwealth or any other body
politic or corporate, shall bear interest at the rate calculated pursuant to
the provisions of this section from the date of entry of such judgment
to and including the last day of the month prior to the month in which
such judgment is satisfied.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993).
Although section 22 references section 37, section 22 does not expressly
authorize postjudgment interest. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 22 (1993)
(stating the treasurer shall satisfy a judgment and include interest authorized by
section 37).
' See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 392, 486 N.E.2d at 56
(recognizing section 37 unilaterally authorizes postjudgment interest in eminent
domain actions).
116 See Woodworth v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 229,
231, 230 N.E.2d 814,
816 (1967) (holding just compensation for a taking requires payment of interest).
157353 Mass. 229, 230 N.E.2d 814 (1967).
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payment at the time of the taking.' 58 Woodworth argued that failure
to pay interest violated the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution and Article 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. 59 The court agreed and asserted that just and reasonable
compensation for a taking required full compensation.160 The court
concluded that full compensation for a public taking includes interest

even if the property owner fails to make a specific demand for interest. 161 The court asserted future questions regarding postjudgment
,"8 See Woodworth, 353 Mass. at 231-32, 230 N.E.2d at 816 (stating the

government is required to pay consideration for a public taking). Woodworth
could not rely on the statutes authorizing postjudgment interest because
Woodworth's judgment was entered prior to the effective date of the statutory
amendments. See id. at 231, 230 N.E.2d at 815 (observing the statutes do not
authorize postjudgment interest because the statutes were not in effect at the time
of judgment).
'

See Woodworth, 353 Mass. at 231, 230 N.E.2d at 815-816 (noting the

question presented to the court). Note the property owner in General Electric
Co. did not recover postjudgment interest, but the owner did not raise
constitutional arguments. See Woodworth, 353 Mass. at 231, 230 N.E.2d at 816
(explaining the GeneralElec. Co. case holds that the Commonwealth is not liable
for postjudgment interest); General Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 661,
663, 110 N.E.2d 101, 102 (1953) (noting General Electric's erroneous reliance on
section 37 of chapter 79).
The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V
(emphasis added).
Article 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states: "[W]henever
the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation
therefor." MASS. GEN. LAWS CONST. Pt. 1, Art. 10 (emphasis added).

See Woodworth, 353 Mass. at 231, 230 N.E.2d at 816 (stating an award of
damages without interest in an eminent domain action is not just).
161 See Woodworth v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass.
229, 232, 230 N.E.2d 814,
'60

816 (1967) (quoting Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1933)).
Jacobs,the United States Supreme Court stated:
The amount recoverable was just compensation, not inadequate compensation. The concept of just compensation is comprehensive, and

In
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interest should be determined pursuant to the existing statutory
authority, but the Commonwealth could not escape its
constitutional
62
obligations to pay just and reasonable compensation. 1
The government must pay just and reasonable compensation
when it takes an individual's land for public use. 163 Compensation
cannot be "just" if interest up until the date of payment is denied. 164
Although the federal and Massachusetts constitutions function to
provide a property owner with postjudgment interest, Massachusetts
courts look to and rely on the statutory interest provisions of chapter
79.165 Section 37 of chapter 79 provides a statutorywaiverof sovereign immunity regarding postjudgment interest in eminent domain ac-

includes all elements, "and no specific command to include interest is
necessary when interest or its equivalent is a part of such compensation." The owner is not limited to the value of the property at the time
of the taking; "he is entitled to such addition as will produce the
equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously with the taking." Interest at a proper rate "is a good measure by which to ascertain the
amount so to be added"... [Ihe right to just compensation could not
be taken away by statute or be qualified by the omission of a provision
for interest where such an allowance was appropriate in order to make
the compensation adequate.
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1933) (quoting Seaboard Air Line
R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923)).
362 See Woodworth, 353 Mass. at 233, 230 N.E.2d at 817 (reversing the
lower court and finding the Commonwealth liable for postjudgment interest on
constitutional grounds).
163 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring
just compensation for a taking);
MASS. GEN. LAWS CONST. Pt. 1, Art. 10 (requiring reasonable compensation for a
taking).
'"See Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923)

(stating property owner entitled to just compensation, not inadequate
compensation).
,61See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (stating Commonwealth liable
for interest until payment); Woodworth v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 229, 233,
230 N.E.2d 814, 817 (1967) (stating future questions regarding postjudgment
interest in eminent domain actions be governed by statute).
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tions.166 The Legislature clearly defined the scope of the Commonwealth's consent to suit in eminent domain actions by expressly
authorizing recovery of interest. 167 In Massachusetts, a property
owner may recover postjudgment interest in an eminent domain action because such a claim for interest is within
the scope of the Com68
monwealth's waiver of sovereign immunity. 1
VI. ANALYSIS
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is not liable for postjudgment interest in a contract action. 169 The court in Chapman II relied
almost exclusively on its prior decision in C & M Construction Co.,
Inc. v. Commonwealth.17 ° The court's reliance on C & M Construction Co., Inc. does not sufficiently support the result in Chapman HI
because 1) the facts of C & M Construction Co., Inc. differ significantly from the facts of Chapman I, and 2) the court did not adequately address the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity

in contract actions. 171

I See C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 392, 486
N.E.2d 54, 56 (1985) (recognizing a property owner is not entitled to
postjudgment interest absent statutory authorization).
'67
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (providing express
authorization for postjudgment interest); McArthur Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth,
197 Mass. 137, 138, 83 N.E. 334, 334 (1908) (stating consent to suit and the
scope of the consent may only be expressed by the Legislature).
168See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (providing a statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity regarding postjudgment interest).
169See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr.,
423 Mass. 584, 586, 670
N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996) (holding the Commonwealth is not liable for
postjudgment interest in a contract action).
170See id. at 586-87, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (relying on the
reasoning in C & M
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 486 N.E.2d 54 (1985)).
"' See infra notes 172-231 and accompanying text.
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A. The ContractBecomes a Noncontract
The court in Chapman II concludes Chapman's claim for postjudgment interest is noncontractual. 7 2 A claim against the Commonwealth not based on contract cannot stand absent an express
statutory waiver. 173 Chapman's claim is noncontractual because the
court in C & M Construction Co., Inc. concluded C & M's claim for
postjudgment interest was noncontractual. 17 4 The circumstances of
Chapman's claim significantly differ from C & M's claim but the court
in Chapman II did not address why the two claims should be treated
the same.17
C & M claimed interest for the time period required by the Legislature to appropriate funds to satisfy the judgment. 176 Chapman
claimed interest from the date of judgment to the date of judgment
after rescript. 177 C & M's contract action ended at the time judgment

171

See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 588, 670

N.E.2d 166, 169 (1996) (declaring claims for postjudgment interest are
noncontractual).
'71See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 392, 486 N.E.2d at 56 (seeking
an alternate source for the waiver).
14 See Chapman I, 423 Mass. at 587, 670
N.E.2d at 169 (stating C & M
Constr. Co., Inc. controls Chapman's case).
'71 See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 587, 670
N.E.2d at 169 (asserting the

distinction between the two claims is irrelevant).
176See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 391,
486 N.E.2d at 55 (stating
the issue presented to the court). Judgment was entered for C & M on July 3,
1975 but C & M did not receive payment until July 16, 1976. See id. at 390-91,
486 N.E.2d at 55 (explaining the procedural history). The Commonwealth did
not appeal the judgment, therefore payment occurred more than one year after
judgment due to the delay in the Legislature to appropriate the funds. Id.
" See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 585, 670 N.E.2d at 168 (explaining the
clerk refused to issue an execution including postjudgment interest). The
amended judgment after rescript awarded postjudgment interest from the date of
judgment to the date of judgment after rescript. Id. Upon the clerk's refusal to
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entered in the trial court because the Commonwealth did not ap-

peal. 178 Final resolution of Chapman's contract claim did not occur
until the Supreme Judicial Court issued its decision in Chapman L'79
C & M filed a separate lawsuit claiming postjudgment interest.'
Chapman filed a motion for postjudgment interest.' 8 ' The court in
Chapman H1 concluded the reasoning in C & M Construction Co.,
Inc. controlled, however the reasoning in C & M Construction Co.,
Inc. does not comport with the facts in Chapman11182
The Commonwealth waives the protections of sovereign immunity in a contract action when it enters into a contract.' 8 3 In C & M
Construction Co., Inc., the plaintiff argued the action for postjudgment interest was a continuation of the underlying contract claim and
therefore the scope of the Commonwealth's common law waiver 1of
84
sovereign immunity included liability for postjudgment interest.

issue an execution including postjudgment interest, Chapman moved for interest
to the date of execution. Id.
178 See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 390-91, 486 N.E.2d at 55
(presenting the facts). C & M's contract action ended when the Commonwealth's
time to file an appeal expired. See MASS. R. Civ. P. 4 (1985). Neither the
Commonwealth, C & M or the court make this distinction and therefore this note
similarly concludes that the contract action ended upon entry of judgment. See C
& M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 391, 486 N.E.2d at 55 (noting C & M
claimed interest from the date of judgment).
'79 See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 417 Mass. 104, 106, 628
N.E.2d 8, 10 (1994) (deciding Chapman's contract action).
"oSee C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass at 390, 486 N.E.2d at 55 (stating
C & M's judgment was issued in a prior action).
...
See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 585, 670 N.E.2d at 168 (explaining the
procedural history).
182 See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 587, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (relying solely on
the reasoning in C & M Constr.Co., Inc.).
183 See Monadnock Display Fireworks, Inc. v. Andover,
388 Mass. 153, 15657, 445 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1983) (recognizing a municipal government owes a
duty to a private party when it enters into a contract).
'"See C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 391, 486
N.E.2d 54, 55 (1985) (summarizing plaintiff's argument).
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The court disagreed and found C & M's action for postjudgment interest was noncontractual. 185
The court provided no additional support for its conclusion but it
was unnecessary to look any further than the facts to determine C &
M's claim for postjudgment interest was noncontractual. 8 6 The contract claim ended upon the trial court's judgment and C & M filed a
separate action for interest. 187 C & M's second lawsuit was not
founded on contract because the trial court's judgment represented
the final disposition of the rights of the parties under the contract.'
The court in Chapman 11 concluded a claim for postjudgment
interest is noncontractual but disregarded the factual differences between Chapman's claim and C & M's claim.189 The court reasoned
the nature of postjudgment interest is noncontractual even if the underlying claim is based on contract. 190 The holding in Chapman II
that the Commonwealth is not liable for postjudgment interest in
contract actions rests solely on the premise that a claim for postjudgment interest is noncontractual. 19 ' The court established the law in
Massachusetts but did not set forth any definitive case or statute re92
garding the noncontractual nature of postjudgment interest. 1

...
See id. at 391-92, 486 N.E.2d at 55 (disposing of C & M's argument by
concluding the claim for interest was not contractual).
186 See id. at 392, 486 N.E.2d at 56 (stating C & M's action for interest is not
based on the contract). The court cited chapter 235, section 8 as authority that
postjudgment interest is not part of the underlying contract claim. Id.
187 Id.

See id. at 391-92, 486 N.E.2d at 55-56 (stating C & M's claim for
postjudgment interest was a separate action).
'89See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 587, 670
N.E.2d 166, 169 (1996) (stating the distinction was "without significance").
190 See id. at 587-88,
670 N.E.2d at 169 (quoting Falmouth Hosp. v.
Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 548 n.6, 503 N.E.2d
1322, 1324 (1987)).
'9'See id. at 588, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (concluding a claim for postjudgment
interest must be authorized statutorily).
'92Id. at 587-88, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (discussing the nature of postjudgment
interest). The court did cite an appeals court decision discussing the nature of
188
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The inherent nature of sovereignty dictates that C & M not recover postjudgment interest for the time it takes the Legislature to
appropriate the funds to satisfy the judgment.193 Chapman claimed
interest because Chapman's judgment was not payable while the
Commonwealth pursued final resolution of the contract claim through
the appellate process for over two years. 194 Chapman was not enti-

postjudgment interest. See id. (quoting Falmouth Hosp. v. Commissioner of Pub.
Welfare, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 548 n.6, 503 N.E.2d 1322, 1324 (1987)). The
quoted text from Falmouth Hosp. discusses the court's holding in C & M Constr.
Co., Inc. Id.

'9'See Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 618, 296
N.E.2d 461, 465 (1973) (discussing the origins of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (limiting the
Commonwealth's liability for postjudgment interest up to thirty days for the time
it takes the Commonwealth to satisfy the judgment). Section 37 states "a
judgment against the commonwealth shall not bear interest if it is satisfied within
thirty days of such entry." Id.
It took the Commonwealth over one year to satisfy C & M's judgment and
the delay was primarily due to the time it took the Legislature to appropriate
funds. C & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 391, 486
N.E.2d 54, 55 (1985).
'94 See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 585, 670
N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996) (discussing the calculations necessary to determine the
final amount owed to Chapman).
The court did acknowledge the distinction between an action involving an
appeal and an action due to unreasonable delay in payment when it addressed
Chapman's argument regarding unlawful detention of funds. Id. at 588, 670
N.E.2d at 169-70 (relying on the distinction to find that funds were not
unlawfully detained). Interest may be allowed against the Commonwealth for the
wrongful detention of money if the Commonwealth has not done all that the law
has required it to do. See Perkins Sch. for the Blind v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 383
Mass. 825, 831, 423 N.E.2d 765, 770 (1981) (setting forth the standard of
analysis for the wrongful detention of money).
Chapman argued the
Commonwealth's unsuccessful appeal delayed payment for an unreasonable
amount of time resulting in an unlawful detention of funds. See Chapman II, 423
Mass. at 588, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (addressing Chapman's argument). Chapman
referred to two prior decisions where postjudgment interest was awarded for
wrongful detention of money but in each instance no appeal on the underlying
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tied to interest for the time it took the Legislature to appropriate the
funds.'9 The nature of Chapman's claim for postjudgment interest in
these circumstances is contractual and the Commonwealth should pay
interest as any other private citizen would while the Commonwealth
pursued an appeal. 196 The court in Chapman I expanded the scope
of the holding in C & M Construction Co., Inc. by concluding the
contract action ends upon entry of judgment by the trial court, notwithstanding an appeal, but provided no additional support consistent
with the facts in Chapman II.197

claim was made. See id.; Perkins Sch. for the Blind, 383 Mass. at 834, 423
N.E.2d at 771 (permitting interest against the Commonwealth due to
unreasonable delay in payment and due to no fault of the plaintiff);
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 359 Mass. 206, 209,
268 N.E.2d 654, 656-57 (1971) (concluding an unreasonable detention of money
gives rise to interest).
The court in Chapman II reasoned, unlike Perkins School for the Blind and
Massachusetts General Hospital, the Commonwealth made a legitimate appeal
and therefore did not unreasonably delay payment. See Chapman II, 423 Mass.
at 588, 670 N.E.2d at 169-70 (rejecting plaintiffs argument). Similar to Perkins
School for the Blind and Massachusetts GeneralHospital,the government in C &
M Constr. Co., Inc. did not appeal the underlying claim, yet C & M's argument
for wrongful detention of money due to unreasonable delay failed. See C & M
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 394, 486 N.E.2d 54, 57
(1985) (concluding C & M's reliance on Perkins Sch. for the Blind was
"misplaced").
'9'See C & M Constr. Co., Inc., 396 Mass. at 390, 486 N.E.2d at 55 (holding
the Commonwealth not liable for interest during the time it takes the Legislature
to appropriate funds to satisfy the judgment).
196See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (requiring
interest from the
date of entry of judgment to the date of payment).
'97 See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 587, 670
N.E.2d 166, 169 (1996) (stating the facts distinguishing C & M Constr. Co., Inc.
are irrelevant to its holding). The phrase "judgment of the trial court," although
redundant, is used for explanatory purposes. See MASS. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (1998)
(defining "judgment" and "final judgment" as the final act of the trial court).
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B. Sovereign Immunity
The court in Chapman II relied on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and rules of statutory construction to reach its holding but
these same concepts also support Chapman's argument that a claim
for postjudgment interest is contractual in nature. 198 The Commonwealth may only be impleaded in its courts with its consent. 199 When
such consent is given the Commonwealth may only be impleaded in
the manner and to the extent expressly given. 200 The contractual relationships among the parties defines the scope of the Commonwealth's consent to suit in a contract action. 201 The court in Chapman IIconcluded the Commonwealth's consent to suit, the common
law waiver of sovereign immunity created when the Commonwealth
entered into the contract, did not attach to Chapman's claim for inter'98See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 586-87, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (maintaining
statutes applicable to private parties are not necessarily applicable to the
Commonwealth).
'" See Broadhurst v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 373 Mass. 720,
722-23, 369 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (1977) (quoting General Elec. Co. v.
Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 661, 664, 110 N.E.2d 101, 102 (1953)); McArthur
Bros. v. Commonwealth, 197 Mass. 137, 138, 83 N.E. 334, 334 (1940) (declaring
consent to suit may only be granted by the Legislature); Nash v. Commonwealth,
174 Mass. 335, 338, 54 N.E. 865, 866 (1899) (stating Commonwealth's consent
to suit must be "clearly manifested by [an] act of [the] legislature); but see
Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 619, 296 N.E.2d 461,
465 (1973) (asserting sovereign immunity is a judicially created doctrine
therefore legislative consent to suit is not necessary).
200 See McArthur Bros. Co., 197 Mass. at 138, 83 N.E. at 334 (stating
consent limited to the exact terms expressed).
2'0See Monadnock Display Fireworks, Inc. v. Andover, 388 Mass. 153, 15657, 445 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1983) (reasoning sovereign immunity does not bar a
claim arising from contract); R. Zoppo Co. v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 401,
404, 232 N.E.2d 346, 349 (1967) (stating "the law applicable to public contracts
is the same as that applicable to private contracts"); Boston Molasses Co. v.
Commonwealth, 193 Mass. 387, 389, 79 N.E. 827, 827 (1907) (explaining the
Commonwealth is treated as a private person when it enters into a contract).
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est. 20 2 The court determined the nature of postjudgment interest is
noncontractual therefore the 20Commonwealth's
liability for interest
3
statute.
a
in
must be expressed
The general postjudgment interest statute does not expressly
authorize interest against the Commonwealth. 20 4 The court in Chapman II concluded the absence of an express authorization for postjudgment interest in chapter 235, section 8 precluded Chapman's recovery. 20 5 The court relied on the reasoning in C & M Construction
Co., Inc. that the statute awarding postjudgment interest in eminent
domain cases indicated the Legislature's20 6intent that chapter 235, section 8 not apply to the Commonwealth.
The scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity in a contract action differs from the scope of the waiver in tort and eminent domain
actions. 207 The scope of the Commonwealth's consent to suit in tort
actions is statutory and is found in the Massachusetts Tort Claims

202

See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 588, 670

N.E.2d 166, 169 (1996) (reiterating Chapman's claim for interest is
noncontractual).
203 See id. (quoting Falmouth Hosp. v. Commissioner
of Pub. Welfare, 23
Mass. App. Ct. 545, 548 n.6, 503 N.E.2d 1322, 1324 (1987)).
204See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (making no specific reference
to the Commonwealth or any other government entity).
205 See Chapman II, 423 Mass. at 588, 670 N.E.2d
at 169 (stressing no
statutory authority exists for awarding postjudgrnent interest).
2o See id. at 586-87, 670 N.E.2d at 169 (quoting C & M Constr.
Co., Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 393, 486 N.E.2d 54, 56 (1985)). The eminent
domain postjudgment interest statute would have been unnecessary if the
Legislature intended chapter 235, section 8 to authorize postjudgment interest
against the Commonwealth in all instances. Id.
207See Monadnock Display Fireworks, Inc. v. Andover, 388 Mass.
153, 15657, 445 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1983) (pointing to the common law waiver of
sovereign immunity that exists in contract actions); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, §§
1-45 (1993) (setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties in an eminent
domain action); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-12 (1985) (setting forth the
rights and obligations of the parties in a tort action).
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Act. 08 The scope of the Commonwealth's consent to suit in eminent
domain actions is also statutory and is found in chapter 79 of the general laws. 20 9 The MTCA and chapter 79 provide comprehensive
statutory schemes that delineate the rights and obligations of the private parties and government entities involved in tort and eminent domain actions.2 l0 The MTCA does not expressly authorize recovery of
postjudgment interest and this limits the Commonwealth's consent to
suit regarding postjudgment interest. z
Chapter 79 expressly
authorizes recovery of postjudgment interest in eminent domain actions. 212
The "rules of construction governing statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are stringent" and the courts must look to the express
language of the statutes to determine the rights and obligations of the
parties. 213 Unlike the waiver of sovereign immunity in tort and emi20$See

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-12 (1985) (setting forth the scope of

the Commonwealth's consent to suit in tort actions).
209 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, §§ 1-45 (1993) (setting forth the scope of
the Commonwealth's consent to suit in eminent domain actions).
20 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, §§ 1-45 (1993); MASS. GEN.

LAWS ch. 258,

§§ 1-12 (1985).
212 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (1985) (stating Commonwealth not
liable for prejudgment interest). The Supreme Judicial Court held the MTCA's
silence regarding postjudgment interest requires an interpretation of the statute
that the Commonwealth is not liable for postjudgment interest because waivers of
sovereign immunity are strictly construed. See Onofrio v. Department of Mental
Health, 411 Mass. 657, 659, 584 N.E.2d 619, 620 (1992) (discussing statutes
governing waivers of sovereign immunity).
22 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (providing for interest until
payment).
2'
See Onofrio, 411 Mass. at 659, 584 N.E.2d at 620 (quoting Ware v.
Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 89, 91, 564 N.E.2d 998, 999 (1991)); Broadhurst v.
Director of Div. of Emp. Sec., 373 Mass. 720, 727, 369 N.E.2d 1018, 1022-23
(1977) (concluding Legislature's silence regarding interest in unemployment
benefits statute evinces an intent that Commonwealth is not liable). The court in
Broadhurst stated "[w]e think that the legislative silence as to interest in c. 15 IA,
which otherwise contains a rather detailed consideration of proceedings and
remedy, indicates a legislative intent that interest not be payable on
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nent domain actions, the waiver of immunity in a contract action is
not statutory.214 Where the Legislature enacts a comprehensive statute regarding a particular subject it evinces an intent that such statute
stand as the authority governing that subject.21 5 No such statute governs contract actions.21 6
The Commonwealth is treated as a private party when it enters
into a contract.217 The United States Supreme Court stated "[i]f the
[government] comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that
govern individuals there., 218 Unlike tort actions and eminent domain
actions, no comprehensive statutory scheme exists in the general laws
that governs contract actions against the Commonwealth. 21 9 A pri-

unemployment benefits." Broadhurst,373 Mass. at 727, 369 N.E.2d at 1022-23
(emphasis added).
214 See Monadnock Display Fireworks, Inc. v. Andover, 388 Mass. 153, 15657, 445 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1983) (recognizing the common law waiver of
sovereign immunity in contract actions).
"' See Lafayette Place Assoc. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 427 Mass. 509, 534,
694 N.E.2d 820, 836 (1998) (stating the authority for tort liability against a
public entity is the MTCA, notwithstanding competing statutory provisions).
116 See Monadnock Display Fireworks,
Inc., 388 Mass. at 156-57, 445
N.E.2d at 1056 (recognizing the waiver of immunity in contract actions is not
statutory).
217See Boston Molasses Co. v. Commonwealth, 193 Mass. 387, 389, 79 N.E.
827, 827 (1907) (citing Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5, 11 (1880)).
21 See Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (quoted in R. Zoppo
Co. v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 401, 404, 232 N.E.2d 346, 349 (1967)).
2,9 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 1-45 (1993) (governing eminent domain
actions against the Commonwealth); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-12 (1985)
(governing tort actions against the Commonwealth); Onofrio v. Department of
Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 659, 584 N.E.2d 619, 620 (1992) (stating the
MTCA is a statute governing waiver of sovereign immunity); Whitehouse v.
Sherbom, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 668, 673, 419 N.E.2d 293, 297 (1981) (stating
chapter 79 is the sole remedy available in eminent domain actions).
In Onofrio, the court based its opinion on the statutory scheme that
governed tort actions against the Commonwealth. See Onofrio, 411 Mass. at 660
n.4, 584 N.E.2d at 620 (explaining its decision rests on a distinct statutory
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vate party litigant commencing a contract claim against the Commonwealth looks to the same statutes as if the litigant were bringing

an action against a private party. 220 Unlike tort actions and eminent

scheme). The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the MTCA expressly
prohibits recovery of prejudgment interest therefore its silence regarding
postjudgment interest implies postjudgment interest is not barred. Id. at 659, 584
N.E.2d at 620 (recognizing the special analysis required to interpret statutes
waiving sovereign immunity). The court's rejection of the argument supports the
notion that plaintiffs must look exclusively to the MTCA to determine the scope
of the waiver of immunity. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (1985) (barring
recovery of prejudgment interest). The Legislature addressed the issue of
prejudgment interest specifically in tort actions in chapter 231, section 6B and
generally in chapter 235, section 8. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6B (West
Supp. 1999) (providing the mechanics for calculation of prejudgment interest in
tort actions and making no reference to the Commonwealth); MASS.

GEN. LAWS

ch. 235, § 8 (1986) (requiring payment of interest upon a report, verdict, or
finding until entry of judgment).
Prior to enactment of the MTCA, sovereign immunity protected the
Commonwealth from tort actions and similarly, from paying interest pursuant to
chapter 231, section 6B or chapter 235, section 8. See Morash & Sons, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 623, 296 N.E.2d 461, 468 (1973) (proffering a
comprehensive statute is necessary to waive sovereign immunity in tort actions to
avoid indiscriminate and unjust results). Barring recovery of prejudgment
interest in the MTCA was essentially unnecessary because the Commonwealth
was already protected by sovereign immunity from liability for prejudgment
interest under the general interest statutes. Id. The Legislature expressly
precluded recovery of prejudgment interest indicating the MTCA was intended to
be comprehensive. Id. This supports the notion the Legislature intended the
MTCA to be the exclusive source designating the Commonwealth's consent to
suit in tort actions. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-12 (1985) (governing
the scope of the Commonwealth's consent to suit).
220See Nash v. Commonwealth, 174 Mass. 335, 339, 54 N.E. 865, 867
(1899) (holding statute gives superior court jurisdiction over claim "of the
character which civilized governments have always recognized"); People v.
Stephens, 71 N.Y. 527, 549 (1878) (quoted in Boston Molasses Co. v.
Commonwealth, 193 Mass. 387, 389-90 (1907)). The court in Stephens stated:
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The state, in all its contracts ... with individuals, must be adjudged
and abide by the rules which govern in determining the rights of private citizens contracting.., with each other. There is not one law for
the sovereign and another for the subject; but when the sovereign ...
contracts with individuals, . . . the rights and obligations of the contracting parties must be adjusted upon the same principles as if both
contracting parties were private persons. Both stand upon equality before the law, and the sovereign is merged in the contractor, dealer and
suitor.
Stephens, 71 N.Y. at 549. The scope of an action was such that the parties to the
contract had equal rights and obligations "whenever the contract in any form
[came] before the courts." Id.
Massachusetts laws at one time limited contract actions against the
Commonwealth. See 1882 Mass. Acts ch. 195, § 1 (providing the superior court
with jurisdiction for certain contract claims against the Commonwealth); Wesson
v. Commonwealth, 144 Mass. 60, 63, 10 N.E. 762, 766 (1887) (holding
Commonwealth not liable for breach of a contract not involving payment of
money). An 1882 statute stated the superior court hadjurisdiction of "all claims
against the commonwealth which are founded on contract for the payment of
money." 1882 Mass. Acts ch. 195, § 1 (emphasis added). The Supreme Judicial
Court interpreted chapter 195 to preclude an action for damages against the state
for breach of a contract that required an act other than the payment of money.
See Wesson, 144 Mass. at 62, 10 N.E. at 765 (limiting the scope of the superior
court's jurisdiction). Shortly after Wesson, the Legislature amended chapter 195,
section 1, and gave the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or equity." See 1887 Mass. Acts ch. 246
(emphasis added).
In Murdock ParlorGrate Co. v. Commonwealth, the court interpreted the
scope of amended chapter 195, section 1 and addressed whether the plaintiff may
maintain a tort action against the state. See Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v.
Commonwealth, 152 Mass. 28, 31, 24 N.E. 854, 855 (1890) (considering the
Commonwealth's tort liability). The court held the language "whether at law or
equity" did not enlarge the statute to include the requested remedy in tort. Id.
The court analyzed which actions amended chapter 195 encompassed to
determine those actions it excluded. Id. at 31, 24 N.E. at 855 (discussing the
development of the statute). The court concluded the amendment indicated the
Legislature's intent to modify the holding in Wesson. Id. As a result of the
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domain actions, a private party does not rely on express statutory
authority to bring a contract action against the Commonwealth because the waiver of sovereign immunity is not statutory. 22 1
The court's conclusion in Chapman II and C & M Construction
Co., Inc. that authorizing postjudgment interest in eminent domain
actions evinced a legislative intent that the general postjudgment interest statute, chapter 235, section 8, not be applied in contract ac222
tions does not completely address the issue of sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Judicial Court in 1956 recognized that statutes governing postjudgment interest in eminent domain actions consisted of an
entirely separate body of law from the law governing postjudgment
interest in contract actions.2 23 A private party bringing an eminent

amendment, a private party's contract action was no longer limited to an action
founded on a contract for the payment of money. See 1887 Mass. Acts ch. 246
(amending chapter 195, section 1).
221See Boston Molasses Co. v. Commonwealth, 193 Mass.
387, 389, 79 N.E.
827, 826 (1907) (discussing the nature of sovereignty in a contract action). The
court stated:
[I]n giving this lease the commonwealth was not acting in its political
character as sovereign, but merely as the owner of property, about
which it was making a contract. As to this contractit put itself into the
position of a private citizen, and the lease must be construed as if it
were made between two individuals.
Id. (emphasis added).
222See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 586-87,
670 N.E.2d 166, 169 (1996) (concluding chapter 235, section 8 does not
authorize postjudgment interest against the Commonwealth); C & M Constr. Co.,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 393, 486 N.E.2d 54, 56 (1985) (relying
on rules of statutory construction to deny postjudgment interest).
223See C & R Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 334 Mass. 232, 234, 135
N.E.2d 539, 540 (1956) (holding the Commonwealth liable for interest). In C
&R Construction Co., a contractor sought to recover the balance due from the
Commonwealth for work it did on Logan International Airport. Id. at 232, 135
N.E.2d at 539. The contractor brought the action under chapter 258, and cited
section one as authority that the state was liable for interest. Id. at 233, 135
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domain action looks to chapter 79 to determine his rights and obligations and courts look to the eminent domain statutes to determine the
Commonwealth's liability for postjudgment interest.224 A private
party bringing a contract action against the Commonwealth, however,
looks to the same statutes as any other private citizen would. 225 It is
unnecessary for the Legislature to expressly authorize postjudgment
interest against the Commonwealth in the general postjudgment interest statute for the same reason it is unnecessary to expressly reference
the Commonwealth in the statute governing the statute of limita-

N.E.2d at 540. In 1956, chapter 258, section one stated in pertinent part, "[t]he
superior court, except as otherwise expressly provided, shall have jurisdiction of
all claims at law or in equity against the commonwealth. Such claims may be
enforced by petition stating clearly and concisely the nature of the claim and the
damages demanded." MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 1 (1956).
The court did not distinguish between prejudgment or postjudgment interest
but made a broad finding that the state was liable for interest. C & R Constr. Co.,
334 Mass. at 234, 135 N.E.2d at 540. The court agreed with C & R's argument
that "the Commonwealth is bound to pay interest on valid claims against it if, in
similar circumstances, interest would be charged against a private person." Id. at
233, 135 N.E.2d at 540.
The court noted in dicta the case of GeneralElectric Co. v. Commonwealth
where the court held the Commonwealth was not liable for interest in an eminent
domain action from the date of judgment until payment. Id. The court in C & R
Construction Co. stated that GeneralElectric Co., involving an eminent domain
action, was not an authority that the Commonwealth is not liable for interest in an
action under chapter 258, section 1, a contract action. Id.
Note the statutory schemes relied on in General Electric Co. and C & R
Construction Co. have been amended or repealed such that neither would be
applicable today. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 37 (1993) (providing express
authorization for postjudgment interest); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-12
(1985) (setting forth the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act).
114 See Whitehouse v. Sherbom, 11 Mass.
App. Ct. 668, 673 n.9, 419 N.E.2d
293, 297 (1981) (recognizing chapter 79 intended to update and consolidate the
law in Massachusetts).
22 See R. Zoppo Co. v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 401, 404, 232 N.E.2d
346, 349 (1967) (recognizing the law is the same for public and private

contracts).
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tions. 226 A contract claim against the Commonwealth is determined in
the same manner and to the same extent as a contract claim against a
private citizen.227
Just compensation requires payment of postjudgment interest. 228
Although a private party litigant in a contract action against the
Commonwealth does not have a constitutional or statutory right to
just compensation, a private party does have a right to contract with
the Commonwealth and rely on the laws to the same extent as if contracting with a private party.2 29 Payment of postjudgment interest,
however, is noncontractual and a private party litigant must look to
express waivers of sovereign immunity to recover postjudgment interest 2 30 The same laws do not apply to the Commonwealth in contract actions because no such express waiver exists. 23
VII. CONCLUSION
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is not liable for postjudgment interest in contract actions. The holding in Chapman v. University of Massachusetts Medical Center?32 forecloses the possibility of
recovering postjudgment interest unless the Commonwealth consents
to such liability in the express terms of a contract. The antiquated
doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the Commonwealth from li226See

MASS.

GEN. LAWS

ch, 260, § 2 (1996) (providing a 6 year statute of

limitations in contract actions).
227

See R. Zoppo Co., 353 Mass. at 404, 232 N.E.2d at 349 (citing Chilton

Club 22
v.8 Commonwealth, 323 Mass. 543, 545, 83 N.E.2d 265, 266 (1949)).
See Woodworth v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 229, 230, 230 N.E.2d 814,
816 (1967) (announcing the Massachusetts Constitution requires payment of
interest in an eminent domain action).
229See R. Zoppo Co. v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 401, 404, 232 N.E.2d
346, 349 (1967) (stating the "law applicable to public contracts is the same as
that applicable to private contracts").
230See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 586, 670
N.E.2d 166, 168 (1996) (holding the Commonwealth is not liable for
postjudgment interest).
231

Id.

232See

423 Mass. 584, 670 N.E.2d 166 (1996).
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ability for postjudgment interest because no express statutory authorization exists. The Commonwealth has the luxury of appealing a trial
court judgment in bliss because it may ignore the basic economic notion of the time value of money. A private party litigant, however,
must defend the appeal with the unfortunate knowledge that a judgment today is not worth more than a judgment tomorrow.
A private party litigant may not recover postjudgment interest
against the Commonwealth absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. A
private party may not rely on the common law waiver that exists
when the Commonwealth enters into a contract because the nature of
postjudgment interest is noncontractual. In Chapman H, the Commonwealth appealed a contract claim and Chapman defended a contract claim. Chapman could not recover on the contract claim until
the appeals process ended. Chapman recovered over $200,000 for
breach of contract. Chapman's contract claim did not end until the
Supreme Judicial Court rendered its decision in Chapman I and the
nature of postjudgment interest in these circumstances is contractual.
The waivers of sovereign immunity in eminent domain and tort
actions are different in scope than the waiver in contract actions.
Eminent domain and tort actions against the Commonwealth are governed by statute. A private party may recover postjudgment interest
in an eminent domain action because chapter 79 expressly authorizes
such recovery. A private party in a tort action may not recover postjudgment interest because the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act does
not affirmatively authorize such recovery. In contract actions, the
same laws applicable to private parties apply to the Commonwealth.
Express statutory authority for postjudgment interest is unnecessary
because the general interest statute, chapter 235, section 8, already
applies. The trial court used the very same statute that awards postjudgment interest and awarded Chapman prejudgment interest from
the date of the court's finding to the date ofjudgment.
The 1973 amendments to Rule 54 greatly expanded the postjudgment interest period to the detriment of the private party in a
contract action against the Commonwealth. The Legislature has not
acted since Chapman I1 to provide express statutory authority for
postjudgment interest and this indicates the Legislature's agreement
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with the court's result. The court may have reached the intended result, but it provided little authority to reassure private litigants it was
the correct result. A private party should not be denied interest on a
judgment while the government appeals that judgment but this is exactly the case in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It does not
appear that the Legislature or the courts will take action to correct
this wrong and overrule ChapmanII
Michael V. Greco

